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Abstract 
While policymakers hope to stem migration flows by giving foreign aid, existing empirical evidence 
points in the opposite direction: by loosening budget constraints, aid tends to encourage people to 
emigrate. In this paper, we revisit the aid-migration link using a substantially extended and adjusted 
econometric approach based on a gravity model of international migration.  In contrast to the previous 
literature, we obtain evidence of a negative relationship between aid and emigration rates. This even 
holds for the poorer part of recipient countries, which suggests that the budgetary constraint channel 
does not play a significant role in shaping migration decisions. The most plausible explanation for 
these contrasting results is that, unlike in previous studies, we use migrant flows rather than migrant 
stocks as the dependent variable.  
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1. Introduction 
The question of how to deal with rising South-North migration is currently high on the international 
policy agenda, particularly in Europe. With the refugee crisis and the arrival of thousands of 
migrants on the Southern European coasts, there’s a growing pressure on the European Commission 
and the most affected EU member states to find a quick way to effectively manage (and arrest) the 
migration flows, and many see foreign aid as an essential part of the solution. Indeed, pledges to 
scale up aid to developing countries are now routinely accompanied by statements arguing that 
helping countries to develop gives their people an incentive to stay at home. In June 2015, for 
instance, the UK Defence Secretary declared that “Britain needs to spend more of its budget on 
helping stabilise countries so that it doesn’t have to ‘fish’ migrants out of Mediterranean” (The 
Guardian, 21st June 2015). But does foreign aid really help reduce migration flows? 
Theoretically, the impact of foreign aid on migration is subject to contrasting forces and its net 
effect is not clear cut a priori (Parsons and Winters 2014; Berthélemy et al. 2009). In general, there 
is no direct link between aid and migration.1 Aid is expected to affect the determinants of migration, 
most notably incomes in developing countries; the hypothesis is that aid raises disposable incomes 
and that higher incomes in turn reduce emigration (Income Channel).2 Aid might also influence 
other determinants of migration, in particular the impact that additional wealth could have on 
financing migration costs for a larger share of the population in the countries of origin (Budgetary 
Constraint Channel). This transmission mechanism would point in the opposite direction of aid-
induced rises in migrant outflows, indicating that loosening budget constraints makes migration 
more feasible. Combining the two channels gives rise to the hypothesis of a hump-shaped pattern of 
migration (see, for example, Clemens 2014), which implies that at very low levels of income per 
capita, growth spurs migration by allowing poor migrants to better afford the migration-related 
costs (the Budgetary Constraint Channel dominates), whereas at higher levels of income per capita 
the Income Channel becomes more and more important relative to the Budgetary Constraint 
Channel. 
The link between aid flows and migration is still fairly unexplored empirically. Yet, there appears to 
be some consensus in the literature that the effect of foreign aid on migration flows is positive, 
suggesting that the Budgetary Constraint Channel dominates the Income Channel. Faini and 
Venturini (1993) postulate that income growth may fail to halt emigration because it relaxes credit 
                                                          
1 The migration compacts currently being discussed at the EU-level (see EC 2016) would constitute an exception.  
2 Note that for the income channel to work, aid needs only to raise disposable household incomes, but not economy-
wide growth rates. Hence, the highly contentious debate on the aid-growth relationship (see, for example, Rajan and 
Subramanian 2008) is not touched upon here.  
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constraints, which tend to be especially binding in poorer contexts. They estimate some simple 
regressions using migration data for Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey and find support for their 
hypothesis. A more recent and influential cross-country study that investigates the aid-migration 
link is Berthélemy et al. (2009). In addition to the budgetary and income effect, they also identify a 
Network Channel through which bilateral aid may be associated with migration flows: more 
bilateral contacts through the implementation of aid projects increases the information on the donor 
country available among potential migrants in the recipient country, which implies lower 
transaction costs for the migrants. Their cross-section estimates indicate that both bilateral aid and 
recipient’s total aid have significantly positive impacts on migrant stocks. 
In this paper, we argue that the issue of how foreign aid affects migration decisions is not yet 
resolved and provide new empirical evidence on the aid-migration link. Our analysis departs from 
Berthélemy et al. (2009), but we substantially extend and adjust their approach in a number of 
ways. First, we employ migrant flows rather than stocks as the dependent variable. Using stocks 
may be misleading as migrants born in country of origin 𝑖 may have resided in destination country 
𝑛 long before foreign aid was given to that destination country. In addition, differences in stocks -–  
a measure  often  utilized in the literature as a proxy for gross migration flows (see for instance 
Beine and Parsons, 2015) – are affected by return migration and can take negative values. Hence, 
the stock variable cannot effectively capture the effect of foreign aid on the migration decision. 
Migrant stocks are included as an additional regressor to proxy for migrant networks that reduce the 
cost of moving to destination country 𝑛. Second, we pool time-series and cross-section data instead 
of using a pure cross section, which attenuates econometric problems concerning the identification 
of causal effects. Most importantly, through the appropriate specification of destination and origin 
fixed effects, we can account for so-called multilateral resistance to migration, i.e. for the fact that 
the choice of a potential migrant to move to a given destination country does not only depend on the 
attractiveness of the country of destination relative to the country of origin, “but also on how this 
relates to the opportunities to move to other destinations” (Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga 
2013), p.79). Failing to capture multilateral resistance to migration may create large distortions in 
the estimated coefficients (ibid). Third, we derive our econometric specification from a gravity 
model of international migration. Since we conjecture that foreign aid may have an impact on the 
budget constraint at the household level, the model provides a microfoundation of the link between 
income generated through aid inflows and migration choices. Fourth, we run separate regressions 
for poorer and richer recipient countries, which enables us to test whether the budgetary constraint 
channel is indeed relevant at low levels of per capita income. Finally, we control for time-varying, 
origin-specific covariates of migration decisions, such as environmental factors and the presence of 
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conflicts. We interact the conflict variable with foreign aid in order to examine whether donors are 
able to check migrant flows in conflict situations.  
In contrast to the previous literature, we obtain evidence of a negative relationship between ODA 
and emigration rates. This even holds for the poorer half of recipient countries, which suggests that 
the budgetary constraint channel does not play a significant role in shaping migration decisions. We 
also find that foreign aid has an even stronger negative impact on the emigration rate in the 
presence of conflicts. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we derive the econometric 
specification employed in the empirical analysis and discuss how we addressed the challenge of 
identifying causal effects. Section 3 introduces the data and provides some descriptive evidence on 
the link between foreign aid and migration, while Section 4 presents the regression results. Section 
5 concludes. 
 
2. Model and Econometric Specification 
Our econometric analysis of the relationship between foreign aid and migration builds upon the 
model of international migration introduced by Beine and Parsons (2015), to which we add the 
bilateral aid given by country n to country I, as well as the overall aid received by country I, as 
factors affecting migration decisions. The model depicts homogeneous agents whose decision on 
whether and where to migrate is based on a comparison of the utility associated with each possible 
destination. Individuals maximize their utility across a pool of destinations, including the home 
country. At each period of time 𝑡, the native population in country 𝑛,  denoted by 𝑁𝑛,𝑡,  chooses its 
optimal location among a set of 𝑖 alternative destinations including home country 𝑛. The number of 
individuals born in country 𝑛 who choose 𝑖 as optimal destination is denoted by 𝑁𝑛𝑖,𝑡.  The utility of 
an individual born in country 𝑛 and staying in that country at time 𝑡 is log-linear in income and 
function of the characteristics of the country of origin as well as the costs associated with migration. 
It is given by 
(1)  𝑢𝑛𝑛,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑛,𝑡) + 𝐴𝑛,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑛,𝑡 
where 𝑤𝑛,𝑡 refers to the wage in country 𝑛 at time 𝑡, 𝐴𝑛,𝑡 denotes the characteristics of country 𝑛  –  
including, for instance, expenditures on public goods, employment opportunities, and amenities, as 
well as the amount of foreign aid received – and 𝜀𝑛,𝑡  is an independent and identically distributed 
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(i.i.d.) extreme-value distributed error term. The utility associated with migration from the origin 
country 𝑛 (recipient) to the destination country 𝑖 (donor) at time 𝑡 is given by  
(2)  𝑢𝑖𝑛,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑖,𝑡) + 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖𝑛,𝑡(. ) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝐶𝑛𝑖,𝑡(. ) stands for the costs associated with migration. As the error term has an i.i.d. extreme-
value distribution by construction, following McFadden (1974) we can express the probability that 
an individual born in country 𝑛 will move to country 𝑖 as 
(3)  𝑃𝑟 [𝑢𝑖𝑛,𝑡 = max
𝑘
𝑢𝑛𝑘,𝑡] =
𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑡
𝑁𝑛,𝑡
=
𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑖,𝑡) + 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖𝑛,𝑡(. )]
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑘,𝑡) + 𝐴𝑘,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑛𝑘,𝑡(. )]𝑘
 
If we take the ratio between number of people who emigrate ( 𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑡 ) and the corresponding 
expression for the number of stayers (𝑁𝑛𝑛,𝑡), the bilateral migration rate between n and i  (𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑡/
𝑁𝑛𝑛,𝑡)  can therefore be written as 
(4)  
𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑡
𝑁𝑛𝑛,𝑡
=
𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑖,𝑡) + 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖𝑛,𝑡(. )]
𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑛,𝑡) + 𝐴𝑛,𝑡]
 
Taking logs, the equation reduces to: 
(5)   𝑙𝑛 (
𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑡
𝑁𝑛𝑛,𝑡
) = 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑤𝑛,𝑡
) + 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐴𝑛,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖𝑛,𝑡(. ) 
Equation (5) identifies the main determinants of the aggregate bilateral migration rate: the wage 
differential as given by the ratio 𝑤𝑖,𝑡/𝑤𝑛,𝑡, the characteristics at destination 𝐴𝑖,𝑡, the characteristics 
at origin 𝐴𝑛,𝑡 , and the migration costs of moving from 𝑛 to  𝑖, 𝐶𝑛𝑖,𝑡. 
The migration cost function incorporates time-invariant as well as time-varying factors. Following 
Beine and Parsons (2015), we assume separability in all these determinants. Among the time- 
varying components of 𝐶𝑛𝑖,𝑡, we distinguish two kinds of network variable: the size of migrant 
networks, a standard determinant of migration cost which we capture by the pre-determined stock 
of migrants from country 𝑛  living in country 𝑖  (denoted by MigStockin,t−1 ), and bilateral aid 
(BilAidni,t−1), which increases contacts between residents of the two countries and thereby lowers 
transaction costs for prospective migrants. The time-invariant factors include standard gravity-type 
dyadic determinants such as physical distance (distni), linguistic distance (LangDistni), and past 
colonial relationships (Colonyni)), together with monadic components that are specific to the origin 
country but constant over time (𝑥𝑛), such as the geographic location. We also add factors that are 
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destination-specific, either constant over time 𝑥𝑖, time-specific 𝑥𝑡 (such as the general decrease in 
transportation costs), or time-varying 𝑥𝑖,𝑡. The cost function can then be expressed as  
 
(6)   𝐶𝑖𝑛,𝑡 = 𝑐(MigStockin,t−1, BilAidni,t−1distni, Colonyni, LangDistni, , 𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑥𝑖,𝑡, 𝑥𝑛) 
Time-varying characteristics at origin 𝐴𝑛,𝑡 comprise: the aggregate level of foreign aid the country 
receives (AggAidn,t−1), which is supposed to positively affect the welfare of the local population; 
the presence (or absence) of conflict (Conflictn,t−1); a variable that controls for the quality of 
governance ( Governancen,t−1);  adverse environmental factors as measured by the number of 
natural disasters in a given year (NatDisn,t−1); 3 and demographic push factors at origin, which we 
capture by the total dependency ratio, i.e. the total population aged less than 15 or over 64 as a share 
of the working age population (Dependencyn,t−1).  
The function for the time-varying characteristics at origin can thus be expressed as 
(7)  𝐴𝑛,𝑡 = 𝐴(AggAidn,t−1,Conflictn,t−1, Governancen,t−1, NatDisn,t−1, Dependencyn,t−1) 
For simplicity, we are not showing the expression for the time-varying determinants of migration 
costs 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 along the lines of Equation (7) as the impact of those factors will be entirely absorbed by 
the inclusion of destination-time fixed effects in the econometric analysis.  
Inserting the expressions for  𝐴𝑛,𝑡  and 𝐶𝑛𝑖,𝑡  into Equation (5) leads to the following econometric 
specification, on which the regression results presented below are based: 
(8)  𝑙𝑛 (
𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑡
𝑁𝑛𝑛,𝑡
) = 𝛽1𝑙𝑛 (
𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑤𝑛,𝑡
) + 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎𝑛 + 𝛽2ln(AggAidn,t−1) + 𝛽3(Conflictn,t−1) +
  𝛽4(Governancen,t−1) + 𝛽5(Dependencyn,t−1) + 𝛽6(NatDisn,t−1) + 𝛽7ln (1 + MigStockin,t−1) +
 𝛽8𝑙𝑛(distni) + 𝛽9(Colonyni) + 𝛽10(LangDistni) + 𝛽11ln (BilAidni,t−1) + 𝜀𝑛𝑖,𝑡   
Since our main focus is on estimating the impact of aggregate aid – a variable that is time-variant at 
origin –, on migration decisions, we use an appropriate set of fixed effects 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑎𝑛 to absorb the 
impact of destination-specific and time-invariant origin determinants of migration, respectively. 
The inclusion of these fixed effects leads to important advantages in the empirical specification. 
First, it significantly lowers the risk of misspecification and therefore renders it easier to correctly 
                                                          
3 Natural disasters include droughts, earthquakes, extreme temperatures, floods, storms, volcanic eruptions, epidemics, 
insect infestations, and miscellaneous occurrences (i.e., technological accidents of a non-industrial or transport nature). 
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identify the impact of foreign aid. In particular, the inclusion of 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 absorbs the impact of migration 
policies, which are likely to be highly significant drivers of migration decisions but for which data 
are often not readily available.4 Second, and most importantly, this specification also allows us to 
account for multilateral resistance to migration. Building on the intuition of Anderson and Van 
Wincoop (2003, 2004), Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2013) stressed the importance of 
accounting for multilateral resistance to migration in the gravity framework because failing to do so 
would lead to significant biases in the estimated coefficients of the determinants of migration The 
standard approach to control for multilateral resistance to migration in our model is through the 
inclusion of fixed origin-time and destination-time effects. It is important to note that our inclusion 
of destination time-varying fixed effects will completely account for any multilateral resistance in 
receiving countries (see Feenstra, 2004), which – as Beine and Parsons (2015) pointed out – is 
presumably the most important aspect in the context of international migration, given the prominent 
role that migration policies of the destination country play. Moreover, we found that using origin 
and time fixed effects yield similar results for the dyadic factors to the inclusion of origin-time fixed 
effects, a result that is in line with Parsons (2012).5  This makes us confident that our model 
effectively captures multilateral resistance to migration in origin countries.  
Beside the fixed effects, which attenuate potential estimation biases, we include a fairly limited 
number of controls. In addition to aggregate aid, our main variable of interest, we choose a selected 
group of key indicators, which we consider the main drivers of international migration. Importantly, 
as shown below, almost all these factors have a robust impact on bilateral migration with expected 
signs in line with the previous literature.6  
Endogeneity concerns 
An important econometric issue in our specification is the potential endogeneity of the stock of 
migrants and the bilateral aid flows. The first source of endogeneity of bilateral aid and the network 
variables in migration models is associated with the potential omission of unobserved factors that 
might be correlated both with the error term (and thus migration rates) and with these bilateral 
covariates. Beine et al. (2011) implement a set of instruments including guest-worker programs and 
                                                          
4 Ortega and Peri (2013) found a significant impact of migration policies at destination. However, they focus on 
tightness of entry laws, which captures only part of the migration decision determinants on the policy side. Indeed, as 
Ortega and Peri (2013) themselves pointed out, “besides entry laws, other laws may be relevant to migration decisions: 
integration and citizenship, access to public services and so on”.  
5 The results for the comparison between the gravity model with origin-time fixed effects on the one hand and separate 
time and origin fixed effects on the other are available upon request. It has to be noted that the findings of Parsons 
(2012) are obtained in the context of international trade, but we believe the same arguments on the impact of 
multilateral resistance apply here.  
6See Beine et al. (2015) for a thorough review of the determinants of international migration using a gravity framework.  
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a variable capturing the unobserved diaspora in the 1960s. Reassuringly, they find that the estimated 
coefficient of their diaspora variable is largely unaffected by the use of instrumental variables. 
However, their empirical analysis is for a cross-section without an 𝑛𝑖, 𝑡 dimension, and hence their 
instruments are not applicable here. In the absence of valid instruments, Beine and Parsons (2015) 
address the issue of endogeneity of the network variable by augmenting the model with additional 
covariates, which potentially capture part of the effect of these time-varying factors, and find that 
the impact of the diaspora is robust to such an extension. Along the same lines, as a robustness 
check, we add bilateral trade flows – both imports and exports –  that can reasonably be related to 
both migrant stocks and bilateral ODA, as well as the error term. Trade-migration links have been 
shown to exist in a large number of empirical studies (for a survey, see Parsons and Winters, 2014). 
Likewise, both the aid allocation literature that identifies trade interests as one important donor 
motive (e.g. Hoeffler and Outram, 2011), and the literature on the impact of aid for trade (e.g. 
Hühne et al., 2014; Calì and Te Velde, 2011) suggest a correlation between international trade and 
foreign aid.   
The other source of potential endogeneity is reverse causality. Reverse causality is unlikely to be a 
concern for the network variable, given that our proxy for migrant networks is predetermined with 
respect to migration flows. For bilateral ODA, however, it cannot be ruled out. More specifically, 
even in a specification with predetermined ODA flows from time (𝑡 − 1), actual migration flows at 
time 𝑡  can be considered the expected flows at time (𝑡 − 1),  and expected flows may play an 
important role in the amount of bilateral aid given to any particular country of origin. For instance, 
the EU’s practical stance on co-development has largely revolved around the interests of destination 
countries (Gubert, 2014), targeting development aid to those recipients willing to implement 
migration control measures and accept repatriation. In an empirical study on a large sample of 
country pairs, comprised of 22 donors and more than 150 recipients over the period 1993-2008, 
Bermeo and Leblang (2015) find that donors do indeed use foreign aid to achieve their broader 
immigration goals, targeting migrant sending areas to increase development and decrease the 
demand for entry into the donor country. 
To address the potential endogeneity due to the joint determination of aid and migration, we follow 
Berthélemy et al. (2009) and employ a three-stage least squares (3SLS) approach to estimate the 
effect of foreign aid on migration flows for a system of equations. While the migration equation is 
defined as above, the bilateral aid equation in the 3SLS estimation is given by  
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(9)  ln (BilAidni,t−1) = 𝛼1𝑙𝑛 (
𝑁𝑖𝑛,𝑡
𝑁𝑛𝑛,𝑡
) + 𝛼2ln(BilTradeni,t−1) + 𝛼3ln(BilTradein,t−1) +
𝛼4Colonyni + 𝛼5ln(AggAidn,t−1)  +  𝛼6Governancen,t−1 + 𝛼7ln(GDPpcn,t−1) +
 𝛼8ln(Popn,t−1) +  𝛼9Conflictn,t−1 + 𝛼10NatDisn,t−1 +   𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑛 + uin,t−1           
Equation (9) contains the main elements of the conventional aid allocation framework (e.g. Hoeffler 
and Outram, 2011), including: GDP per capita (GDPpcn,t−1) and natural disasters (NatDisn,t−1) as 
indicators of recipient need; the quality of governance as an indicator of recipient merit; and 
exports (BilTradein,t−1) as an indicator of donor self-interest. It deviates in several respects from 
the one estimated by Berthélemy et al. (2009). First, contrary to the cross-section estimated in 
Berthélemy et al. (2009), the aid equation proposed here contains the same set of fixed effects as the 
migration equation. This allows us to address (at least partially) any omitted variable bias because 
𝑎𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑎𝑛 capture all time-varying, donor-specific factors as well as the time-invariant recipient-
specific determinants that may affect aid flows. Second, bilateral aid is a function of the “expected” 
bilateral migration flows. Third, to capture trade intensity, instead of trade openness we include the 
actual bilateral trade flows – imports and exports – between donor and recipient.  
 
3. Data and Descriptive Analysis 
Data 
The sample used in the subsequent empirical analysis includes 28 donor countries (migrant 
destination) and 136 recipient countries (migrant origin). The period under consideration is 1995 to 
2014. Data on migration – both the bilateral stocks of immigrants born in country n and resident in 
country i as well as the annual bilateral migration flows – are from the OECD international 
migration database. The missing observations in the migration dataset are automatically dropped. 
The number of zeros in the dependent variable amounts to around five percent of the total number 
of observations. Hence, taking logs of emigration rates in the dependent variable is unlikely to 
cause a considerable loss of information that could create severely biased results due to a possible 
selection bias. In addition, the Poisson PML approach proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006) to deal with the problem of zero observations only fully accounts for multilateral resistance 
to migration and therefore is consistent only if origin-time fixed effects are included (Beine et al., 
2015). Hence, it cannot be applied in our context as the fixed effects would capture the impact of 
our main variable of interest, AggAidn,t−1, which varies over time at origin.    
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For our main explanatory variable of interest, foreign aid, data are gross disbursements expressed in 
constant US dollars from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)-OECD dataset. In a 
robustness check we alternatively employ net disbursements, which may come closer than gross 
disbursements to capturing the resources that actually reach the population of the recipient country. 
We take averages for the bilateral as well as the total aid received to account for the volatility of 
annual aid flows. Specifically, bilateral and total aid received at time t-1 is the 3-year average 
between t-1 and t-3. The wage ratio between destination and origin, another variable of major 
interest, is proxied by the correspondent ratio of GDP per capita in constant US dollars. 
Most of the remaining control variables are specified along conventional lines. The only major 
exception is linguistic distance, for which we use a more refined measure of language proximity 
introduced by Adsera and Pytlikova (2015), instead of the standard dummy for common official 
language usually employed in the literature.7 This index ranges from 0 to 1, depending on “how 
many levels of the linguistic family tree the languages of both the destination and the source 
country share”. As for the quality of governance in countries of origin, we include the World 
Bank’s index of Political Stability and Absence of Violence, which emphasizes the security aspect 
of governance, in the baseline specification. We acknowledge, however, that many other aspects of 
governance may also affect migration decisions and thus we perform a robustness check using 
Voice and Accountability and Regulatory Quality as alternative governance indicators relating to 
democracy and state effectiveness, respectively. A complete list of variables, including brief 
descriptions and sources, is given in Table A1. 
Descriptive Analysis 
A stylized fact of the migration literature is that, at relatively low levels of GDP per capita, an 
income increase will be associated with a rise in migration, whereas the reverse is true at  relatively 
high levels of GDP per capita, giving rise to a hump-shaped distribution (e.g. Adams and Page 
2003; Clemens, 2014; Hatton and Williamson, 2002). We also observe such a hump-shaped 
relationship between GDP per capita and the share of total flows of emigrants in the countries of 
origin quite clearly in our data (see Figure 1).  
According to previous empirical studies (Berthélemy et al. ,2009; Faini and Venturini, 1993), this 
hump-shaped pattern carries over to the link between foreign aid and migration. In our dataset, total 
ODA and the emigration rate appear to be negatively correlated (see Figure 2). In addition, the 
                                                          
7 To depict former colonial relationships and the presence of conflicts at origin in a particular year we utilize standard 
dummy variables.  
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slope seems to be constant for any level of ODA, as the quadratic trend has a shape that is very 
similar to the linear one. More importantly, the same pattern prevails at different levels of income. 
Figure 3 plots the relationship between aid and the emigration rate and for the first (0th – 33rd) and 
the third (66th – 100th) tercile of the GDP per capita distribution: the slope is clearly negative for 
poorer as well as for relatively richer countries. What emerges from this simple correlation is that 
the additional aid received seems to provide an incentive to stay rather than leave. In other words, 
the budgetary constraint hypothesis, according to which any poverty reduction that would be 
induced by foreign aid may help to alleviate the budgetary constraint faced by the poor and may 
then translate into more migration, does not seem to apply here. In the next section, we investigate 
whether this finding continues to hold in a multivariate regression framework.  
 
4. Regression Results 
In presenting the regression results, we start with a base specification along the lines of equation (8) 
and then add a number of robustness checks.  
Baseline regressions 
Table 1 reports the baseline estimates using a Pooled OLS approach. The first three columns show 
results based on the full sample. Following Ortega and Peri (2013), we progressively add fixed 
effects to the specification, starting with destination-year fixed effects (column 2) and then also 
including origin fixed effects (column 3). Comparing columns 1-3 reveals large differences between 
specifications for several covariates – the coefficient of Conflictn,t−1,  for example, turns from 
significantly negative to significantly positive, whereas the opposite is true for  
PolStabilityn,t−1  –, which indicates how important it is to properly account for multilateral 
resistance to migration.  
Column 3 reports for the full sample the results of our preferred specification, including all fixed 
effects, while the last two columns show the corresponding regression coefficients obtained from 
separate estimations of countries below and above the median of GDP per capita. In column 3, all 
the dyadic determinants of migration, with the exception of the GDP ratio, have the expected sign 
and are statistically significant. A larger diaspora, linguistic affinity, and a colonial relationship all 
spur migration flows. Conversely, the larger the distance between origin and destination (i.e., the 
greater the migration costs), the lower, on average, are the associated migration flows. As columns 
4 and 5 reveal, these relationships hold, irrespective of whether richer or poorer countries of origin 
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are considered. The GDP ratio coefficient is insignificant for the full sample, but in accordance with 
Figure 1 above shows the familiar hump-shape if we split the sample into poorer and richer 
countries: its impact on emigration rates is significantly negative at lower levels of GDP per capita 
and turns significantly positive at relatively higher levels of GDP per capita.  
Our estimates reveal that the attraction effect of bilateral foreign aid is positive and significant; this 
finding is consistent across different levels of income. However, the impact is much smaller than 
the one reported by Berthélemy et al. (2009). We attribute the weaker effect in our analysis to the 
inclusion of the migrant stock variable among the covariates. Indeed, the size of migrant networks 
is likely to have a much larger influence on the information channel of the migration decision as 
compared to bilateral aid flows. The magnitude of the diaspora effect we estimate is in line with the 
previous literature on the determinants of international migration (see for instance Beine and 
Parsons, 2015; Beine et al., 2015).    
Turning to the monadic determinants of migration, our main variable of interest – the aggregate 
ODA received – is negatively associated with migration flows. More importantly, and in line with 
the descriptive evidence, the split samples reveal that larger inflows of ODA have a negative impact 
on bilateral emigration flows at any level of income. This corroborates that the budgetary constraint 
hypothesis for the impact of ODA on migration in poor contexts does not appear to be an adequate 
interpretation of the empirical evidence. Furthermore, this finding has important implications in 
terms of external spillovers, as an increase of foreign aid from sources other than country i 
(multilateral ODA or bilateral ODA from sources 𝑘 ≠ 𝑖) reduces the flows of migrants towards 
country i. Interestingly, the evidence suggests that an individual donor country has a negligible 
compound effect on migration to itself, as the sum of bilateral and total ODA coefficients is very 
close to zero. In other words, our results indicate that the positive effect associated to the network 
channel of foreign aid is (almost) completely offset by the income channel.As expected, conflict is 
an important driver of emigration. However, this applies especially in poor contexts; for those 
countries that are located above the median the conflict dummy is no longer significant. All 
regressions include the aid-conflict interaction, which indicates that foreign aid has an even stronger 
negative impact on emigration rates in the presence of conflicts. Again, this is particularly evident 
in countries with below-median incomes. The dependency ratio has the expected negative effect on 
migration flows,8 while the incentive to emigrate rises with the level of political instability in the 
                                                          
8 A high total dependency ratio indicates a scarcity of workers to support both the young and the elderly, either directly 
or through the tax system. Conversely, a low dependency ratio implies that a large number of working age people exist 
at origin, which increases the likelihood of emigration. 
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country of origin. 9  Both effects are significant for the full sample but turn insignificant at 
conventional levels when running separate regressions for richer and poorer countries. Finally, the 
number of natural disasters in the origin country is not a significant determinant of international 
migration, which corroborates the previous finding by Beine and Parsons (2015), whose analysis 
placed particular focus on the potential role of environmental factors in shaping migration 
decisions. 
 
Robustness checks  
In our first robustness check, we replicate our analysis using 3SLS in order to address the issue of 
joint determination of bilateral aid and migration. The estimates of the migration equation are 
presented in Table 2. Reassuringly, the results essentially confirm the findings of the Pooled OLS 
model, with no changes in the sign and statistical significance of coefficients, the only exception 
being dependency in column 3. The size of coefficients is also generally in the same order of 
magnitude in both specifications. Table A2 shows the results for the corresponding aid equation. 
The expected migration flows have a positive impact on the bilateral ODA flows, which suggests 
that efforts, for example by the EU, to target development aid to recipients willing to implement 
migration control measures and accept repatriations is not the dominant driver of bilateral aid 
allocations. The remaining covariates point to the mix of selfish and altruistic donor motives 
typically found in the aid allocation literature (e.g. Hoeffler and Outram, 2011; Acht et al., 2015). 
On the one hand, the political and economic interests of donors play a significant role: former 
colonies receive more foreign aid, and bilateral trade relationships positively affect aid inflows, 
with exports from donor to recipients having a much larger impact. On the other hand, donors take 
recipient need into account, giving more aid to poorer recipients. As for the institutional variables, 
there is no clear pattern: donors seem to favor democracies (Voice and Accountability), but not to 
pay attention to the quality of the recipients’ government (Political stability and Regulatory 
Quality). This ambiguity is also in line with the previous literature (e.g. Clist, 2011). 
Table 3 compares our baseline results of Table 1 with the estimates based on the same specification 
that includes additionally only bilateral trade relationships, both imports and exports. The purpose is 
to test for omitted variable bias: imports and exports might be correlated with both the intensity of 
                                                          
9 Note that the expected theoretical sign of political stability at origin is ambiguous. This is because, while repressive 
political regimes might increase residents’ desire to leave, they typically also increase the costs of migration. It might be 
extremely difficult for residents living in a dictatorship to obtain authorization to leave the country, for example. 
Foreign diplomatic representation also tends to be less important in such countries, which, in turn, significantly raises 
the costs for emigration candidates to obtain a visa. 
14 
 
migrant flows, as well as migrant stocks and bilateral aid flows, thereby affecting the estimated 
impact of the two variables on migrant flows. As it turns out, the impact of trade flows is not 
significant, leaving the coefficients of all other covariates substantially unaffected. Given that trade 
is arguably the most plausible omitted variable from the baseline regression, we interpret this as an 
indication that our regression model is well specified in terms of the covariates included. 
Beside endogeneity concerns, the heterogeneity of foreign aid constitutes a major empirical 
challenge. Various authors (e.g. Qian, 2015; Bazzi et al., 2012) argue that the impact of aggregate 
ODA is difficult to interpret as it is comprised of many different types of aid (debt relief, cash 
transfers, food, etc.) and each type of aid affects a different set of outcomes. Concerning the study 
of the aid-migration link, only some types of aid (e.g. aid for infrastructure) may lead to sustained 
positive income effects and thus potentially reduce migration, while others (e.g. emergency aid) 
may at best raise income in the short run. While resolving this issue would go far beyond the scope 
of this paper, we offer some significant evidence by examining two specific types of aid, 
humanitarian aid and technical cooperation.10 Similarly to Aleksynska and Peri (2014), we use the 
fact that the value of ODA labelled as “humanitarian” according to the OECD-DAC classification 
(Humanin,t−1 ), is equal to aggregate ODA (AggAidn,t−1 ) multiplied by the corresponding share of 
humanitarian aid  (ShareHumann,t−1,), i.e. Humanin,t−1=AggAidn,t−1*ShareHumann,t−1 . Hence, 
by taking logs and using log properties, we can separate the effect into two terms: 
ln (AggAidn,t−1) + ln (ShareHumann,t−1). The same holds for technical assistance. The advantage 
of this type of specification is that it builds on previous studies examining the aid-migration nexus, 
which included the log of aggregate ODA as a covariate in a gravity setup. Furthermore, in our 
pooled OLS setting, aggregate ODA absorbs common factors that affect aggregate ODA as well as 
migration, allowing us to isolate and disentangle the extra impact of humanitarian aid on migration 
flows within the same specification. The results reported in Table 4 indicate that the negative effect 
of ODA on migration seems to be predominantly driven by non-humanitarian aid, such as technical 
cooperation. Indeed, increasing the share of humanitarian aid over total ODA received has a 
positive additional effect on emigration, other factors being constant. We interpret this finding as 
                                                          
10 “Humanitarian aid is assistance designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity 
during and in the aftermath of emergencies. To be classified as humanitarian, aid should be consistent with the 
humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. Humanitarian aid includes: disaster 
prevention and preparedness; the provision of shelter, food, water and sanitation, health services and other items of 
assistance for the benefit of affected people and to facilitate the return to normal lives and livelihoods; measures to 
promote and protect the safety, welfare and dignity of civilians and those no longer taking part in hostilities and 
rehabilitation, reconstruction and transition assistance while the emergency situation persists. Activities to protect the 
security of persons or property through the use or display of force are excluded. It includes aid to refugees in developing 
countries, but not to those in donor countries. Relief food aid comprises supplies of food, and associated costs, provided 
for humanitarian relief purposes” (OECD 2000). 
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consistent with the income channel interpretation: the indirect negative effect on migration through 
a rise in income is more likely in the case of non-humanitarian or developmental aid than 
humanitarian aid, which aims mainly at providing temporary relief. 11  Furthermore, the major 
innovations of our paper as compared to Berthélemy et al. (2009) are that we include the time 
dimension of the aid-migration link and employ migrant flows rather than stocks as the dependent 
variable. To check whether these changes are decisive for our findings, we re-estimated Equation 
(8) for yearly cross-section regressions, alternatively taking log emigration rates and log migrant 
stocks as dependent variables. Table 5 reports the results. We show only the estimates for our 
variable of interest, ln(AggAidn,t−1), while all the other statistics are available upon request. As 
shown in columns 1 and 2, the coefficients of  ln(AggAidn,t−1) exhibit a negative sign in all cross-
sections and for both econometric techniques, as long as the log of emigration is kept as the 
dependent variable. However, if we replace the log emigration rate by the log of the stocks of 
immigrants, the coefficient of our variable of interest becomes positive and statistically significant 
throughout, irrespective of whether OLS or 3SLS is applied (columns 3 and 4). The coefficient 
maintains its positive sign when we perform a Pooled OLS analysis.12 Hence, we can interpret the 
discrepancies between our results and those obtained by Berthélemy et al. (2009) as driven mainly 
by the choice of different dependent variables. Utilizing stocks as a proxy for migration flows is 
quite common in the literature (see for instance Moullan 2013); Campaniello, 2014; Grogger and 
Hanson, 2011; Llull 2011; Belot and Hatton 2012), even though the drawbacks of doing so are 
evident. Perhaps most importantly in our context, the stock measure includes migrants who had 
been living in the countries of destination for decades, which tells little about the influence of recent 
ODA flows on the decision to migrate.13 Furthermore, using stocks as the numerator to calculate 
emigration rates is in contrast with the underlying micro-foundation of the gravity equation, unless 
one assumes a frictionless world (Beine et al., 2015). A popular alternative – adopted for instance 
by Beine and Parsons (2015) – is to consider variations in migrant stocks as a proxy for gross flows. 
While this strategy undoubtedly allows dealing with larger datasets, it gives rise to several empirical 
problems as highlighted by Beine et al. (2015): in contrast to emigration rates, which are positive by 
definition, variations in stocks can take on negative values. Furthermore, variations in stocks are 
                                                          
11 The positive sign of the share of humanitarian aid may also be driven by other factors associated with the specificity  
of this type of ODA. For instance, humanitarian aid is predominantly directed towards people who are often not in the 
financial condition to reach their preferred destination: hence, the level of emigration towards OECD countries would 
be very low even in the presence of relatively high levels of ODA.  However, since our findings indicate that foreign aid 
is even more effective in stemming emigration in conflict situations i.e. contexts characterized by extreme situations of 
violence and poverty, we reckon that the income channel interpretation should be considered more relevant for 
interpreting the positive sign.  
12 Note that the aid equation for the yearly cross-sections shown in Table 5 includes origin-time fixed effects. 
13 Berthélemy et al. (2009) themselves state that “since we are interested in the impact of aid flows on migration, ideally 
we would rely upon migration flow data”. 
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also affected by factors such as return migration, deaths, migration to third countries as well as 
naturalization – depending on whether the status of immigrants is defined according to his or her 
citizenship – and births – depending on whether the ius sanguinis is adopted in the country of 
destination.  
A final set of robustness checks is based on alternative definitions of the aid and governance 
variables. Specifically, we use net total aid rather than gross total aid as this may better capture 
actual resource flows to recipients; and we use voice and accountability and regulatory quality 
instead of political stability to represent other dimension of governance. Replacing gross 
disbursements by net disbursements leaves all results qualitatively unaffected, with only minor 
changes in estimated coefficients (see columns 1-3).  Likewise, introducing the two other 
governance indicators hardly affects the coefficients of all other covariates (see column 4). The 
indicators themselves are negatively – and significantly in the case of regulatory quality – 
associated with emigration rates, i.e. better governance reduces migrant flows as previously shown 
for political stability in the baseline specification.    
5. Concluding remarks  
In this paper, we have revisited the aid-migration link based on a gravity model of international 
migration. In contrast to the previous literature, our empirical results point to a robust negative 
relationship between aggregate aid received and emigration rates. We also find that, at the level of 
individual donors, (positive) network effects and (negative) income effects of aid on migration tend 
to cancel out, which suggests that (negative) spillovers from one donor’s aid to another donor’s 
immigration rates play a significant role. Taken together, this gives the impression that 
policymakers in rich countries are right to view foreign aid as an appropriate instrument to curb the 
flow of migrants, but that they would have to act collectively. It has to be noted, however, that the 
aggregate results presented here can only provide a very rough guide for policymaking, because of 
the heterogeneous impacts of different types of foreign aid, which we illustrate by drawing a 
distinction between the effects of humanitarian and non-humanitarian aid on migrant flows in one 
of our robustness checks. A sectorally disaggregated analysis would constitute an important step 
towards arriving at more nuanced policy conclusions. To the best of our knowledge, the only study 
that applies such an approach to investigate the aid-migration link is by Moullan (2013), who 
examines the impact of foreign health aid on the emigration rates of physicians. He concludes that 
aid targeted at the health sector could be a potent weapon against the medical brain drain. 
Additional studies along these lines would help establish a more complete picture of the relationship 
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between aid and migration. Further research is also needed to better understand the exact 
transmission mechanisms through which foreign aid affects migrant flows.  
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Table 1 – Baseline Regressions: Pooled OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Class of Income 
 
ln(EMratein,t) 
0th – 100th 
ln(EMratein,t) 
0th – 100th 
ln(EMratein,t) 
0th – 100th  
ln(EMratein,t) 
0th – 50th 
ln(EMratein,t) 
50th-100th  
ln(BilAidni,t−1) 0.135
*** 0.099*** 0.093*** 0.106*** 0.096*** 
 
 
(17.95) (15.97) (16.91) (12.93) (12.53) 
ln(AggAidn,t−1) -0.735
*** -0.591*** -0.092*** -0.126*** -0.106*** 
 (-54.84) (-42.19) (-4.45) (-4.54) (-3.11) 
      
ln(GDPi,t−1/GDPn,t−1) 0.257
*** 0.211*** -0.054 -0.235** 0.264* 
 (14.30) (12.10) (-0.85) (-2.69) (2.11) 
      
ln(MigStockin,t−1) 0.675
*** 0.503*** 0.599*** 0.627*** 0.561*** 
 (89.75) (49.19) (40.28) (27.48) (27.19) 
      
ln(distni) -0.598
*** -0.838*** -0.351*** -0.302*** -0.394*** 
 (-35.58) (-45.72) (-13.22) (-5.22) (-13.03) 
      
Colonyni 0.072 0.509
*** 0.481*** 0.296*** 0.701*** 
 (1.40) (8.66) (9.99) (3.48) (11.04) 
      
LangProxni 0.992
*** 0.827*** 0.445*** 0.408*** 0.552*** 
 (20.41) (18.14) (10.68) (7.16) (5.94) 
      
      
Dependencyn,t−1 -0.004
*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.004 -0.004 
 (-5.40) (-8.89) (-3.69) (-1.43) (-1.12) 
      
PolStabilityn,t−1 0.162
*** 0.156*** -0.043* -0.031 -0.034 
 (9.30) (10.05) (-1.99) (-1.00) (-1.08) 
      
Conflictn,t−1 -8.327
*** -7.674*** 1.780*** 2.723*** 0.960 
 (-15.84) (-15.50) (3.38) (3.53) (1.31) 
      
AggAidn,t−1Conflictn,t−1 0.394
*** 0.368*** -0.084*** -0.126*** -0.050 
 (15.58) (15.46) (-3.31) (-3.40) (-1.42) 
      
NatDisn,t−1 -0.082
*** -0.070 0.002 -0.002 0.001 
 (-30.28) (-25.94) (1.11) (-0.46) (0.27) 
      
 
N 
𝑎𝑛 
𝑎𝑖,𝑡 
  𝑅sq 
14154 
 
 
0.76 
14155 
 
X 
0.81 
14154 
X 
X 
0.91 
7065 
X 
X 
0.89 
7082 
X 
X 
0.92 
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Robust Standard Errors are included. The model includes the intercept. The estimates are obtained using the STATA 
reghdfe command provided by James Correia. For foreign aid we take the 3-year average for both the bilateral as well 
as the total ODA received. So bilateral ODA and total ODA received at time 𝑡 − 1 is the 3-years average between 𝑡 − 1 
and 𝑡 − 3. The first 3 columns show the estimates of Equation (8) for the whole sample with different sets of fixed 
effects. The 4th and 5th columns report the estimates for the values below and above the median of GDP PPP Const. 
US$, respectively 
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Table 2 – Robustness Check: 3SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ln(EMratein,t) 
0th – 100th  
ln(EMratein,t) 
0th – 50th 
ln(EMratein,t) 
50th-100th  
    
ln(BilAidni,t−1) 0.131
*** 0.114** 0.181*** 
 (5.66) 
 
(2.73) (6.39) 
ln(AggAidn,t−1) -0.104
*** -0.133** -0.137*** 
 (-4.14) 
 
(-3.35) (-3.68) 
ln(GDPi,t−1/GDPn,t−1) -0.043 -0.244
** 0.217* 
 (-0.77) (-2.98) (2.20) 
    
ln(MigStockin,t−1) 0.584
*** 0.605*** 0.536*** 
 (74.64) (47.42) (53.56) 
    
ln(distni) -0.386
*** -0.492*** -0.364*** 
 (-13.74) (-6.99) (-12.77) 
    
Colonyni 0.425
*** 0.352** 0.531*** 
 (7.43) (3.18) (8.36) 
    
LangProxni 0.487
*** 0.378*** 0.666*** 
 (11.75) (6.73) (10.86) 
    
    
Dependencyn,t−1 -0.009
*** -0.004 -0.007* 
 (-4.55) (-1.61) (-2.25) 
    
PolStabilityn,t−1 -0.042
* -0.029 -0.026 
 (-2.02) (-0.92) (-0.92) 
    
Conflictn,t−1 1.315
** 2.777*** 0.007 
 (2.77) (4.05) (0.01) 
    
AggAidn,t−1Conflictn,t−1 -0.075
** -0.129*** -0.001 
 (-2.66) (-3.91) (-0.05) 
    
NatDisn,t−1 0.003 
(1.31) 
-0.002 
(-0.43) 
0.001 
(0.47) 
    
           N 
              𝑅sq 
               12291 
                0.91 
                   6167 
                   0.89 
                  6124 
                  0.92 
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Robust Standard Errors are included. The model includes the intercept. The estimates are obtained using the STATA 
reg3 command. For foreign aid we take the 3 years average for both the bilateral as well as the total ODA received. So 
bilateral ODA and total ODA received at time 𝑡 − 1 is the 3-year average between 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡 − 3. The first column 
reports estimates of Equation (8) for the whole sample. The 2nd and the 3rd  columns report the estimates for the values 
below and above the median of GDP PPP Const. US$, respectively 
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Table  3 – Robustness Check: Adding Trade Flows 
 (1) (2) 
 ln(EMratein,t) ln(EMratein,t) 
ln(BilAidni,t−1) 0.093
*** 0.092*** 
 
 
(16.91) (15.69) 
ln(AggAidn,t−1) -0.092
*** -0.079*** 
 (-4.45) 
 
(-3.72) 
ln(GDPi,t−1/GDPn,t−1) -0.054 -0.020 
 (-0.85) (-0.31) 
   
ln(MigStockin,t−1) 0.599
*** 0.599*** 
 (40.28) (35.88) 
   
ln(distni) -0.351
*** -0.356*** 
 (-13.22) (-12.60) 
   
Colonyni 0.481
*** 0.480*** 
 (9.99) (9.27) 
   
LangProxni 0.445
*** 0.456*** 
 (10.68) (9.92) 
 
ln (Tradein−1)   0.008
 
(1.75) 
 
ln (Tradeni−1) 
 
 
 
0.006 
  (0.70) 
 
   
Dependencyn,t−1 -0.008
*** -0.008*** 
 (-3.69) (-3.54) 
   
PolStabilityn,t−1 -0.043
* -0.046* 
 (-1.99) (-2.03) 
   
Conflictn,t−1 1.780
*** 1.318* 
 (3.38) (2.38) 
   
AggAidn,t−1Conflictn,t−1 -0.084
*** -0.061* 
 (-3.31) (-2.29) 
   
NatDisn,t−1 0.002 0.003 
 (1.11) (1.45) 
   
N 
𝑎𝑛 
𝑎𝑖,𝑡 
  𝑅sq 
14154 
X 
X 
0.91 
12288 
X 
X 
0.91 
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Robust Standard Errors are included. The model includes the intercept. The estimates are obtained using the STATA 
reghdfe command provided by James Correia. The first column reports the estimates of Equation (8) for the whole 
sample, the second column shows the estimates of the same model that include bilateral imports and exports. 
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Table  4 – Robustness Check: Humanitarian Aid and Technical Assistance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ln(EMratein,t) ln(EMratein,t) ln(EMratein,t) 
ln(BilAidni,t−1) 0.093
*** 0.092*** 0.095*** 
 (16.91) (16.59) (17.23) 
 
ln(AggAidn,t−1) 
 
-0.092*** 
(-4.45) 
 
-0.084*** 
(-3.92) 
 
-0.218*** 
(-7.48) 
 
ln(ShareHumann,t−1) 
 
 
ln(ShareTechCoopn,t−1) 
 
 0.028** 
(3.28) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.179*** 
(-6.58) 
 
ln(GDPi,t−1/GDPn,t−1) -0.054 -0.086 -0.121 
 (-0.85) (-1.31) (-1.86) 
    
ln(MigStockin,t−1) 0.599
*** 0.609*** 0.600*** 
 (40.28) (40.56) (40.34) 
    
ln(distni) -0.351
*** -0.329*** -0.346*** 
 (-13.22) (-12.85) (-13.05) 
    
Colonyni 0.481
*** 0.490*** 0.477*** 
 (9.99) (10.08) (9.90) 
    
LangProxni 0.445
*** 0.413*** 0.448*** 
 (10.68) (10.04) (10.77) 
Dependencyn,t−1 -0.008
*** -0.008*** -0.007*** 
 (-3.69) (-3.87) (-3.54) 
    
PolStabilityn,t−1 -0.043
* -0.033 -0.039* 
 (-1.99) (-1.52) (-1.77) 
    
Conflictn,t−1 1.780
*** 1.711*** 1.110* 
 (3.38) (3.25) (2.09) 
    
AggAidn,t−1Conflictn,t−1 -0.084
*** -0.081*** -0.050* 
 (-3.31) (-3.19) (-1.98) 
    
NatDisn,t−1 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (1.11) (0.84) (1.02) 
    
N 
𝑎𝑛 
𝑎𝑖,𝑡 
  𝑅sq 
14154 
X 
X 
0.91 
14154 
X 
X 
0.90 
14154 
X 
X 
0.91 
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Robust Standard Errors are included. The model includes the intercept. The estimates are obtained using the STATA 
reg3 command. For foreign aid we take the 3-year average for both the bilateral as well as the total ODA received. So 
bilateral ODA and total ODA received at time 𝑡 − 1 is the 3-years average between 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡 − 3. The first column 
reports the estimates of Equation (8). The second column shows the estimates of Equation (8) for the whole sample 
which includes the share of humanitarian aid, whereas the third column shows the coefficients of Equation (8) that 
includes the share of technical assistance.  
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Table  5 – Robustness Check: Yearly Cross-Sections 
Estimator OLS 
 
3SLS OLS 3SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year                Coefficient ln(EMratein,t) ln(EMratein,t) ln(MigStockin,t−1) ln(MigStockin,t−1) 
 
2014:             ln(AggAidn,t−1) 
 
-0.510*** 
 
-0.506*** 
 
0.441*** 
 
0.334*** 
     
2013:             ln(AggAidn,t−1) -0.483
*** -0.456*** 0.573*** 0.380*** 
     
2012:             ln(AggAidn,t−1) -0.624
*** -0.569*** 0.564*** 0.427*** 
     
2011:             ln(AggAidn,t−1) -0.658
***  0.520***  
     
2010:             ln(AggAidn,t−1) -0.670
*** -0.677*** 0.603*** 0.609*** 
     
2009:             ln(AggAidn,t−1) -0.634
*** -0.638*** 0.540*** 0.512*** 
     
2008:             ln(AggAidn,t−1) -0.602
*** -0.600*** 0.430*** 0.313*** 
     
2007:             ln(AggAidn,t−1) -0.595
*** -0.601*** 0.413*** 0.244** 
     
2006:             ln(AggAidn,t−1) -0.481
*** -0.499*** 0.320*** 0.231** 
     
2005:            ln(AggAidn,t−1) -0.528
*** -0.485*** 0.447*** 0.317*** 
     
2004:            ln(AggAidn,t−1) -0.524
*** -0.485*** 0.495*** 0.339** 
     
2003:            ln(AggAidn,t−1) -0.544
*** -0.578*** 0.415*** 0.284** 
     
2002:            ln(AggAidn,t−1) -0.606
*** -0.573*** 0.365*** 0.284** 
     
2001:            ln(AggAidn,t−1) -0.524
*** -0.529*** 0.408*** 0.147 
     
2000:            ln(AggAidn,t−1) -0.777
*** -0.814*** 0.331** 0.185 
     
1999:            ln(AggAidn,t−1) 
 
-0.531*** -0.471*** 0.403*** 0.279* 
1998:            ln(AggAidn,t−1) -0.692
*** -0.613*** 0.578*** 0.490*** 
     
1997:            ln(AggAidn,t−1) -0.685
***  0.577*** 0.350*** 
     
1996:            ln(AggAidn,t−1) -0.776
***  0.703***  
     
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Robust Standard Errors are included. The models include the intercept. The estimates are obtained using the STATA 
reghdfe command provided by James Correia. The table shows the yearly cross-section estimates of Equation (8) both 
with OLS and 3SLS. Contrary to the estimates of Table 2 based on Equation (9), the aid equation for the system of 
equations in the yearly cross-section includes origin-year as well as destination-year FE. In the first two columns 
emigration rates is the dependent variable, whereas in the third and fourth columns it is migration stocks. Information 
on the rest of the coefficients is available upon request. When left blank, the regression could not be run due to a lack of 
information. 
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Table 6 – Robustness Check: Total Net ODA and Alternative Governance Indicators  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ln(EMratein,t) 
0th – 100th  
ln(EMratein,t) 
0th – 50th  
ln(EMratein,t) 
50th – 100th 
ln(EMratein,t) 
0th-100th  
ln(BilAidni,t−1) 0.095
*** 0.110*** 0.096*** 0.095*** 
 
 
(17.11) (13.24) (12.51) (17.07) 
ln(AggAidn,t−1) -0.105
*** -0.184*** -0.058** -0.090*** 
 (-6.59) (-6.69) (-2.68) (-5.67) 
 
ln(GDPi,t−1/GDPn,t−1) -0.025 -0.235
** 0.324* -0.094 
 (-0.40) (-2.69) (2.54) (-1.43) 
     
ln(MigStockin,t−1) 0.596
*** 0.626*** 0.555*** 0.597*** 
 (39.94) (27.45) (26.84) (39.98) 
     
ln(distni) -0.351
*** -0.297*** -0.399*** -0.352*** 
 (-13.17) (-5.16) (-13.10) (-13.19) 
     
Colonyni 0.481
*** 0.293*** 0.705*** 0.482*** 
 (9.99) (3.46) (11.09) (9.95) 
     
LangProxni 0.438
*** 0.403*** 0.549*** 0.438*** 
 (10.45) (7.08) (7.82) (10.46) 
     
     
Dependencyn,t−1 -0.007
*** -0.002 -0.006 -0.007 
 (-3.58) (-0.09) (-1.77) (-3.21) 
     
Voice Accountabilityn,t−1    -0.001 
    (-0.04) 
     
Regulatory n,t−1    -0.193
*** 
    (-4.83) 
 
PolStabilityn,t−1 
 
-0.042 
(-1.88) 
-0.031 
(-1.03) 
 
0.002 
(0.09) 
 
 
Conflictn,t−1 1.535
** 2.450*** 0.904 1.233* 
 (2.89) 
 
(3.25) 
 
(1.22) (2.31) 
AggAidn,t−1Conflictn,t−1 -0.071
*** -0.113** -0.050 -0.056* 
 (-2.81) (-3.11) (-1.41) (-2.21) 
     
NatDisn,t−1 0.001 -0.003 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.38) (-0.86) (-0.08) (0.58) 
     
 
N 
𝑎𝑛 
𝑎𝑖,𝑡 
  𝑅sq 
13965 
X 
X 
0.91 
7065 
X 
X 
0.89 
6893 
X 
X 
0.92 
13964 
X 
X 
0.91 
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Robust Standard Errors are included. The model includes 
the intercept. The estimates are obtained using the STATA reghdfe command provided by James Correia. For foreign 
aid we take the 3-year average for both the bilateral as well as the total ODA received. So bilateral ODA and total ODA 
received at time 𝑡 − 1 is the 3-year average between 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡 − 3. The first 3 columns show the correspondent 
estimates reported in Table 1 using Net ODA instead of Gross Disbursements. The fourth column shows the estimates 
for the whole sample of Equation (8) with alternative measures of Governance Indicators.  
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Figure 1: Migration Hump – Inverted U shape 
 
Note: On the vertical axis the log of total emigrants over total population by recipient country (time t). On the horizontal axis the log of GDP per 
capita of the countries of origin expressed in PPP 2011 constant US dollars (time t). The sample is composed of 3529 observations and the data covers 
the period 1995-2013. 
 
 
Figure 2: Relationship between ODA and Emigration Rate 
 
Note: On the vertical axis the log of total emigrants over total population by recipient country (time t). On the horizontal axis the log of total gross 
ODA received by recipient (time t). The left hand side shows the linear relationship, while the right hand side shows the quadratic trend. The sample 
is composed of 2678 observations and the data covers the period 1995-2013  
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Figure 3: Relationship between ODA and Emigration Rate at different levels of Income 
 
Note: On the vertical axis the log of total emigrants over total population by recipient country (time t). On the horizontal axis the log of total gross 
ODA received by recipient (time t). The left hand side shows the linear relationship for the first tertile (2716.129 PPP Const. US$, 856 observations) 
of the GDP distribution (0th-33rd), while the right hand side reports the same relationship for the last tertile (8168,.954$, PPP Const.  
US$ 881 observations) of the distribution (66th-100th)). The data covers the period 1995-2013.  
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Table A1: Definition and sources of variables used in the empirical analysis 
Variable Short description Source 
 
Dependent variable 
 
 
𝐥𝐧(𝐄𝐌𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐢𝐧,𝐭) 
 
Bilateral flows of emigrants over  
population of country of origin 
OECD – International 
Migration Database 
 
Explanatory variables 
 
𝐥𝐧(𝐏𝐎𝐏𝐧,𝐭−𝟏)  Population, total (in 1,000). 
 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
𝐥𝐧(𝐓𝐫𝐚𝐝𝐞𝐢𝐧,𝐭−𝟏) 
Trade flows in current US$ from origin 
to destination 
BACI, CEPII 
𝐥𝐧(𝐓𝐫𝐚𝐝𝐞𝐧𝐢,𝐭−𝟏) 
 
Trade flows in current US$ from 
destination to origin 
BACI, CEPII 
𝐥𝐧(𝐁𝐢𝐥𝐀𝐢𝐝𝐧𝐢,𝐭−𝟏) 
 
Bilateral ODA, gross disbursements in 
Constant 2014 US dollars (3 years 
average) 
OECD - DAC 
𝐥𝐧(𝐆𝐃𝐏𝐢,𝐭−𝟏/𝐆𝐃𝐏𝐧,𝐭−𝟏) 
 
Ratio of GDP per capita expressed in 
PPP constant US$ (2011 prices) 
World Bank 
𝐥𝐧(𝐌𝐢𝐠𝐒𝐭𝐨𝐜𝐤𝐢𝐧,𝐭−𝟏) 
 
Stock of migrants born in country n and 
resident in country i 
 
OECD – International 
Migration Database 
 
𝐥𝐧(𝐝𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐧𝐢) 
 
Weighted Distance (var: distw) 
 
CEPII 
𝐂𝐨𝐥𝐨𝐧𝐲𝐧𝐢 
 
Dummy =1 if country pair ever in a 
colonial relationship, 0 otherwise (var: 
colony) 
CEPII 
𝐋𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐱𝐧𝐢 
 
Language Proximity, continuous variable 
from 0 to 1 
 
Adserà, A., and M. 
Pytliková (2015) 
𝐥𝐧(𝐀𝐠𝐠𝐀𝐢𝐝𝐧,𝐭−𝟏) 
 
Total ODA received by country n from 
all donors , gross disbursements in 
Constant 2014 US dollars (3 years 
average) 
OECD - DAC 
𝐃𝐞𝐩𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐲𝐧,𝐭−𝟏 
 
Age Dependency Ratio, calculated as the 
total population aged less than 15 or over 
64, divided by those of working age 
 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank  
𝐏𝐨𝐥 𝐒𝐭𝐚𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲𝐧,𝐭−𝟏 
Index ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 with 
higher value indicating more political 
stability. 
 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank  
𝐕𝐨𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐀𝐜𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲𝐧,𝐭−𝟏 
Index ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 with 
higher value indicating more political 
participation. 
 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank  
29 
 
𝐑𝐞𝐠𝐮𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐲 𝐐𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲𝐧,𝐭−𝟏 
Index ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 with 
higher value indicating better regulatory 
quality. 14 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank  
𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐟𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐭𝐧,𝐭−𝟏  
 
Dummy =1 in the presence of conflict in 
the country of origin, 0 otherwise 
 
UCDP Monadic Conflict 
Onset and Incidence 
Dataset15 
 
𝐍𝐚𝐭𝐃𝐢𝐬𝐧,𝐭−𝟏 
Calculated as the total number of natural 
disasters in a given year16 
 
International Disaster 
Database, Centre for 
Research on the 
Epidemiology of 
Disasters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 The Indexes for Institutional Quality such as Political Stability, Voice and Accountability and Regulatory quality are 
not available for the years 1997, 1999 and 2001: the missing observations are estimated through simple linear 
interpolation. 
15  Sources: UCDP , Melander et al (2016), Gleditsch et al (2002). Available at 
http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/#__utma=1.1404524254.1466678657.1478264508.1479119008.6&__utmb=1.6.10.147911
9008&__utmc=1&__utmx=-
&__utmz=1.1478264508.5.3.utmcsr=google|utmccn=(organic)|utmcmd=organic|utmctr=(not%20provided)&__utmv=-
&__utmk=113218436  
16  It comprises droughts, earthquakes, extreme temperatures, floods, storms, volcanic eruptions, epidemics, insect 
infestations, and miscellaneous occurrences (i.e., technological accidents of a non-industrial or transport nature) 
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Table A2 – 3SLS: Aid Equation  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ln(BilAidni,t−1) 
0th – 100th 
ln(BilAidni,t−1) 
0th – 50th 
ln(BilAidni,t−1) 
50th-100th 
    
ln(EMratein,t) 0.358
*** 0.379*** 0.376*** 
 (23.54) (17.93) (16.79) 
    
ln(Tradein,t−1) 0.072
*** 0.091*** 0.055*** 
 (9.76) (9.49) (5.00) 
    
ln(Tradeni,t−1) 0.274
*** 0.220*** 0.305*** 
 (21.42) (14.09) (14.07) 
    
Colonyni 1.222
*** 1.343*** 0.954*** 
 (16.65) (11.56) (9.34) 
    
ln(AggAidn,t−1) 0.664
*** 0.653*** 0.700*** 
 (20.05) (14.78) (12.91) 
    
ln(GDPn,t−1) -0.466
*** -0.529*** -0.279 
 (-4.41) (-3.81) (-1.39) 
    
ln(POPn,t−1) -0.439 -0.381 0.522 
 (-1.65) (-0.90) (1.08) 
    
Pol Stabilityn,t−1 -0.067 -0.141
** 0.11 
 (-1.70) (-2.60) (0.20) 
    
Voice Accountabilityn,t−1 0.263
*** 0.193* 0.392*** 
 (4.03) 
 
(2.12) (4.29) 
Regulatory Qualityn,t−1 -0.257
*** -0.029 -0.479*** 
 (-3.85) (-0.31) (-4.86) 
 
Conflictn,t−1 0.136
* 0.118 0.146 
 (2.67) (1.78) (1.75) 
    
NatDisn,t−1 -0.000 0.002 0.001 
 (-0.07) (0.34) (0.14) 
 
    
N 
  𝑅sq 
12291 
0.68 
6167 
0.67 
6124 
0.65 
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Robust Standard Errors are included. The model includes the intercept. The Table reports the estimates of Equation (9). 
The first column reports the estimates for the whole sample, whereas the second and the third show the estimates for the 
values below and above the median of GDP PPP Const. US$, respectively 
 
 
 
 
